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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

9 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel H. J. Lemley, Jr., USA (AC/SI)  
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)  
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Colonel C. H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA (JIG)

SUBJECT: NIE 36-56: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN, SYRIA,  
LEBANON, AND IRAQ.

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on 6 April.

2. It is requested that contributions be received, from each according to his ability, by the close of business on 15 May.

STAT

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Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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SUBJECT:   TERMS OF REFERENCE:   NIE 36-56:   PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN  
JORDAN, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND IRAQ

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in the orientation and  
stability of the above-named countries over the next year.

NOTE

This estimate will supersede the relevant sections of NIE 36-54,  
Probable Developments in the Arab States (7 September 1954) and will  
thereby round out the re-evaluation of the principal Arab states begun  
with NIE 36.1-55 (Egypt) in November and now being carried forward with  
NIE 36.6-56 (Saudi Arabia).

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The four countries to be considered in this estimate have been grouped in a single paper rather than taken up separately not only because of the geographical contiguity but also because of the close interrelationships among them. The first three are small, weak states which have figured in innumerable unification schemes in the past and in recent months have been as a group the principal objects of conflicting influences and pressures in the developing inter-Arab power struggle. Iraq is included because of its strong interests and ties in Jordan and Syria and its deep involvement in the future of these states. It is hoped that this approach will not only eliminate the overlap which would have been necessitated by individual country papers but also permit a more coherent treatment of Iraq's "Fertile Crescent" scheme and other Arab unity concepts.

This estimate will be an essentially short range projection. In view of the fluid nature of the situation, however, many of our estimates regarding the probable course of developments will probably still have to be generalized and tentative. For this reason, contributors should place special emphasis on identifying and evaluating the key internal factors in the countries concerned; e.g., the strength and orientation of competing leadership elements and pressure groups, the extent and nature of economic and other basic ties with neighboring countries, etc.

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In order to avoid undue complications, this estimate will address itself exclusively to the probable course of developments over the next year in the absence of major Arab-Israeli hostilities. If necessary, the effects of the outbreak of such hostilities on these and other directly affected countries can be taken up separately.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

- A. Briefly summarize the positions which the various subject countries have occupied in Arab politics and in the Middle East-Western relationship in the past. To what extent has the concept of Arab unity and the various specific unification schemes which have been advanced affected the outlook, politics, and orientation of these countries?
- B. Briefly, how has the situation developed in the past two years? Indicate the salient developments in the Arab power struggle and their impact on the subject states. What is their attitude toward Israel and what has been the effect of the Arab-Israeli dispute? Of the policies of toward the USSR and its activities in the area? the Western Powers? What has been the attitude of the subject/ Briefly, what is the /current orientation and status of the subject countries

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in Arab and world politics and what is being done by interested outside powers (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UK, France, Turkey, and the USSR) to maintain or change this situation?

II. PRESENT INTERNAL SITUATIONS

- A. For each of the subject countries, describe the present division of political power and influence, the present degree of national unity and political stability, and the country's economic situation and outlook. Identify the principal leadership groups, their outlook and objectives, and their sources of support, internal and external. Is significant influence wielded by special groups such as tribal elements, religious elements (including minorities), special economic interests? What are the causes and extent of internal unrest? What is the extent of the underlying economic or other connections between the individual subject countries and other states and how do they delimit or otherwise affect national policies or internal politics? In general, how important are the various competing foreign influences on the political life of the subject countries?

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- B. What is the status of the Communist and fellow-traveler element in the subject countries? What tactics have they pursued and how effective have they been? Have they cooperated directly with Egypt and Saudi Arabia? To what extent have Communist prestige and influence been improved by the arms deal with Egypt and related Bloc diplomatic Communists and their activities? What are the capabilities of moves? What are the attitudes of these countries toward local/ these countries to maintain internal security?
- C. Additionally, with respect to specific countries:
1. Jordan. What roles did the various elements play in the December riots and the recent dismissal of General Glubb? To what extent may these developments be directly attributed to Saudi and Egyptian influence? How do these developments affect Jordan's orientation and stability? What is the strength and influence of the "free officer" group?
  2. Syria. What are the major factions in the army? What is Shishakli's position? that of the SSNP? How effective have Iraq, Turkey, France, and the UK been in winning or retaining influence in Syria?

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3. Lebanon. How extensive and successful have Saudi and Egyptian efforts to win over the press and individual political leaders been? Is Christian-Moslem friction politically significant at present?
4. Iraq. What are Nuri's political strengths and weaknesses? Is there serious dissatisfaction with his internal policies. With his foreign policies? How serious are the differences among Iraq's leaders with respect to the Syrian question or other aspects of Arab policy? How effective have Egyptian and Saudi propaganda efforts been?

III. PROBABLE TRENDS IN ORIENTATION

- A. If ~~the~~ US continues to pursue its present policy, what courses/<sup>of action</sup> are likely to be pursued by Egypt and Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis the subject countries? by the Bloc? What specific objectives are likely to be sought? What policies are likely to be followed by the UK and France? Is German influence likely to be significant?
- B. On the basis of the foregoing, what are the probable trends in the international position and orientation of the subject

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countries? How much are trends with respect to one of the countries likely to affect those of the others? Specifically:

1. Jordan. How far is Jordan likely to go in the direction of diplomatic and military cooperation with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia? Is Jordan likely to accept ESS subsidies? Is it likely to undertake dealings with the Bloc? What is the future of the British connection? What is the outlook for US influence in Jordan, especially with respect to US efforts to promote the Jordan valley scheme and discourage Palestine hostilities?
2. Syria. Is Syria likely to remain committed to a pro-Egyptian-Saudi orientation? How far is it likely to go in dealings with the Bloc and how is its orientation likely to be affected? What is the outlook for British, French, and US influence? For Iraqi-Syrian relations? Are Western oil interests likely to be affected?
3. Lebanon. How successful are Egypt and Saudi Arabia likely to be in efforts to line up Lebanese support?

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What is the outlook for Lebanese-Iraqi relations?  
For US influence? Are Western oil interests likely  
to be affected?

4. Iraq. What is the likelihood of Iraq being isolated  
in the Arab world? What are the chances of its making  
strenuous efforts to re-establish its influence in  
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon by (a) military or subversive  
intervention, or (b) less drastic means? How much  
support would it be likely to obtain from the UK and  
Turkey? In the absence of US support, how successful  
would it be likely to be? What is the likelihood  
of an accommodation with Iraq's Arab rivals and on  
what terms? Assuming US willingness to provide Iraq  
with some arms and economic aid under the Baghdad  
Pact, what is the probable trend in Iraq's attitude  
toward the West and its receptivity toward Bloc offers?  
Are Western oil interests likely to be affected?  
Under what circumstances would Iraq be likely to drop  
out of the Baghdad Pact? What would be the effects  
of Nuri's death or incapacitation on Iraq's foreign  
policies and position?

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- C. What would be the effect on the subject countries of various possible US and/or UK moves, including: (1) abandonment of the Baghdad Pact; (2) increased economic aid to the subject countries, possibly coupled with further de-emphasis on the Baghdad Pact; (3) efforts to promote a standstill agreement under which Iraq would remain the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact but would join in a new inclusive Arab collective security pact; (4) greatly increased support for the Baghdad Pact including US adherence; (5) strong support for Iraq's Greater Syria aspirations; and (6) efforts to station US or UK forces in these or other Arab countries to deter an Arab-Israeli war or for other purposes. What would be the likely reactions of Iraq's Arab rivals, Israel, the Bloc? Are Western oil interests likely to be affected?

IV. PROBABLE TRENDS IN INTERNAL STABILITY

(In preparing this section contributions should take account of section III above, including possible US/UK moves.)

- A. Jordan. What is the outlook for stability in Jordan? What are the king's capabilities for maintaining control and to what extent have they been lessened, directly or indirectly, by departure of British officers from the Arab Legion?

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What would be the effects of the king's death or incapacitation? What elements have the best chance of gaining the ascendancy and how effective would they be likely to be in establishing control? What roles would refugees and the Communists be likely to play? What is the likelihood of Jordan's "falling apart" and what would be the probable consequences?

- B. Syria. What is the likelihood of a further drift to the left and how far might it go? What is the likelihood of a further deterioration of the government's position? Of a military coup? What elements of stability remain in the situation and what is the likelihood of their being strengthened?
- C. Lebanon. Is a serious threat to Lebanon's stability likely to arise within the next year? If so, what form would it be likely to take? What is the likelihood of a strengthening of Lebanon's internal stability?
- D. Iraq. In the light of the above, how vulnerable is Nuri likely to be to Egyptian and Saudi efforts to undermine his domestic position? What Iraqi elements might be marshalled against him and how strong might they become? What elements would probably continue to support him? To what extent

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might Nuri be able to strengthen his position by such alternate moves as adoption of a more vigorous Arab policy, an accommodation with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or an abandonment of his Baghdad Pact ties? How would possible US moves noted above affect Nuri's position? What are the chances of Nuri's death or retirement and what would be the effects on Iraqi stability? What, in particular, would be the effects on the stability of the monarchy?

V. EFFECTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

- A. How would the probable trends discussed above be likely to affect Arab willingness to become involved in large-scale hostilities with Israel? Arab combat capabilities? Israeli policies? How would the prospects for various degrees of Arab-Israeli accommodation be affected?

VI. POST MORTEM AND VALIDITY STUDY

- A. What intelligence deficiencies or problems were noted in preparation of this paper? What corrective action by the IAC do you recommend?
- B. With respect to the countries treated in this estimate, how has NIE 36-54 stood up? In what respects is NIE 36-54, or portions thereof, still valid?